In this tax dispute, Rosser B. Melton, Jr. appeals the trial
court's directed verdict in favor of Collin County Central Appraisal
District (CCAD). In two issues, Melton complains (1) the trial court
erroneously excluded testimony about actual rental income and (2) the
directed verdict was error or should have resulted in a different
outcome in valuation. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background

Melton sued CCAD, contending he was entitled to have a jury
determine the valuation of his property located in McKinney, Texas.
During his case in chief, Melton presented photos of his property to the
jury. In a hearing outside of the jury's presence, Melton requested to
testify about the current rent he collected for the property. CCAD
objected, contending a proper predicate for such evidence had not been
laid and Melton was not qualified to render an expert opinion with

regard to lease rates. CCAD further argued that it would be problematic
to allow the evidence before the jury without someone testifying who was
able to give a proper analysis as to what market rent is and how that
applies to Melton's property.
The trial court denied Melton's request to present the
information to the jury. The court stated that Melton had not
established his ability to testify as to a fair rate for the property
and if [he could not] do that, then the actual rate's really not
relevant. Melton presented no other evidence, and after being
cross-examined, he rested his case. CCAD moved for a directed verdict
based on the lack of evidence presented as to the market value of the
property. The court granted CCAD's motion for directed verdict.

Evidence to Establish Market Value

In his first issue, Melton complains the trial court erred by
excluding his testimony concerning the rental income for the property in
question. Melton argues that under Hunt County Tax Appraisal District v.
Rubbermaid, Inc., 719 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), his testimony involving rental income was admissible. See
Footnote 1 Melton contends that like the objections in Rubbermaid, the
objections in the present case went to the weight of the evidence
instead of its admissibility. Melton appears to contend that if the
present testimony was excluded because of its weight, it was improperly
excluded. The present case, however, is distinguishable from Rubbermaid,
and Melton's argument is without merit as applied to the present case.

In Rubbermaid, our Court concluded the complained-of matters
concerned the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Id.
at 222. However, we reached that conclusion because the parties
stipulated to Rubbermaid's expert's qualification as an appraiser. Id.
Further, Rubbermaid's expert detailed comparable investments, testified
about his familiarity with other rental properties in towns with similar
uses, and explained his adjustments in using those comparable
properties. Id. Although comparable sales data was not used, both
sides' experts testified that comparable sales data was unavailable. Id.
In the present case, however, Melton was not an expert, and
neither party presented testimony from an expert. The parties stipulated
to the admission of CCAD's exhibit showing sales of other properties in
downtown McKinney, but neither party presented any evidence regarding
comparable rent or comparable investments. See Footnote 2 The
objections were made based on Melton's failure to lay the proper
predicate and because Melton was not qualified to render an expert
opinion. In sustaining CCAD's objection, the court stated that Melton
had not established his ability to testify as to a fair rate for the
property so as to make the actual rent relevant. Thus we conclude the
court based its exclusion of Melton's testimony on his lack of
qualifications to testify about the income method for determining
appraisal, and accordingly, it was a question of relevancy and of
admissibility. See Tex. R. Evid. 402, 702.

We conclude that in the present case, the evidence was excluded
because of its admissibility in that Melton did not establish his
ability to testify. We need not address whether this was an abuse of
discretion by the court, however, because Melton has failed to
adequately brief that issue. Melton raises no argument and cites no
authority that the court erred in excluding his testimony based on
admissibility. He asserts no argument and cites to no authority saying
he did establish his ability to testify. And Melton provides no
authority to argue expert testimony was not required. These issues not
being adequately briefed, we do not address them. See Tex. R. App. P.
38.1(h); Wilkinson, 54 S.W.3d at 18. We resolve Melton's first issue
against him.
Directed Verdict

In his second issue, Melton argues the court erred in not
allowing all of the information to go to the jury and in using a number
for its valuation that it is prohibited by law from using. However,
Melton offers no authority to support his argument. In introducing his
second issue, Melton states, What follows is probably correct law, or
mixed fact and law, but the case law is not available to support it. He
has waived his second issue.
Rule 38 of the rules of appellate procedure provides that a
brief to the court of appeals shall contain, among other things, a
clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate
citations to authorities and the record. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h); see
also Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284

(Tex. 1994) (appellate court has discretion to waive point of error due
to inadequate briefing); Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 934
(Tex. 1983). The failure to adequately brief an issue by failing to
provide authorities and record citations waives any error on appeal. See
Fredonia State Bank, 881 S.W.2d at 283-84; Wilkinson, 54 S.W.3d at 18.;
Raitano v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 860 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (The Court does not
represent the appellant and has no duty to search for pertinent
authority.). Because Melton provided no authorities for his argument in
his second issue, we consider this issue waived and resolve his second
issue against him.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.

AMOS L. MAZZANT
JUSTICE
031737F.P05
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Footnote 1
Rubbermaid is the only authority Melton cites. Accordingly, we address
his argument only as it applies Rubbermaid. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h);
Wilkinson v. Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd., 54 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (It is not our function to independently
review the record and research the applicable law to determine whether
this complaint presents reversible error.).
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Footnote 2
Under the tax code, the income method for appraisal of market value
includes the analysis of comparable rental data or the potential earning
capacity of the property, or both; comparable operating expense data;
and comparable data to estimate rates of capitalization or rates of

discount. It further requires projections of future rent or income
potential and expenses to be based on reasonably clear and appropriate
evidence. The tax code states, (a) If the income method of appraisal is
the most appropriate method to use to determine the market value of real
property, the chief appraiser shall:
(1) analyze comparable rental data available to the chief appraiser or
the potential earnings capacity of the property, or both, to estimate
the gross income potential of the property;
(2) analyze comparable operating expense data available to the chief
appraiser to estimate the operating expenses of the property;
(3) analyze comparable data available to the chief appraiser to estimate
rates of capitalization or rates of discount; and
(4) base projections of future rent or income potential and expenses on
reasonably clear and appropriate evidence.
(b) In developing income and expense statements and cash-flow
projections, the chief appraiser shall consider:
(1) historical information and trends;
(2) current supply and demand factors affecting those trends; and
(3) anticipated events such as competition from other similar properties
under construction.
Tex. Tax Code Ann. 23.012 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
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File Date[12/16/2004]