AFFIRM in part; REVERSE and RENDER in part; Opinion Filed November 1,
2004

In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-04-00125-CV
............................
AL-NAYEM INTERNATIONAL TRADING, INC., Appellant
V.
IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT and
CITY OF IRVING, TEXAS, Appellees

.............................................................
On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 02-30703-T-J
.............................................................
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Whittington, Bridges, and Francis
Opinion By Justice Francis

Dallas County brought suit against Al-Nayem International
Trading Company to recover delinquent property taxes on two tracts of
land. Irving Independent School District (IISD) and the City of Irving
intervened in the lawsuit seeking taxes owed to them. After a trial
before the court, judgment was rendered against appellant and in favor
of all three taxing authorities. Appellant challenges the judgment with
respect to IISD and Irving only. In two issues, appellant contends the
trial court erred in admitting into evidence the tax statements offered
by appellees because they were not properly authenticated. Appellant
maintains there is no evidence to support the judgment rendered in favor
of appellees because the only evidence offered by appellees was the
inadmissable tax statements. After reviewing the record, we affirm the

trial court's judgment with respect to IISD. but with respect to the
City of Irving, we reverse and render judgment that Irving take nothing
on its claims against appellant.
We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of
evidence for an abuse of discretion. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v.
Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998). We cannot conclude the trial
court erred if there is any legitimate basis for the ruling. Id. at 43.
Even if we conclude the ruling is erroneous, we will not reverse unless
it is shown that the error probably caused the rendition of an improper
judgment. Id.
We begin our analysis with the tax statements admitted as IISD's
exhibit 1. The exhibit contained a notarized affidavit page signed by
Lisa Freeman as IISD tax assessor-collector. Freeman certified the
attached tax statements were true and correct copies of the delinquent
property tax statements for the properties in question and that they
accurately reflected the amount due and owing to IISD. Each of the two
tax statements attached to the affidavit contained a certification by
Freeman as IISD tax collector that the statement was a true and correct
copy of the original record from the IISD tax roll now in the custody of
the IISD tax assessor-collector office.
Appellant objected to IISD's exhibit 1 on the basis that it was
not properly authenticated because it was not a record under seal and
not signed by someone authorized within the political subdivision under
seal who could attest to the signator's authority. The trial court

overruled appellant's objection on the basis that it was a certified
public record.
Rule 902(4) of the Texas Rule of Civil Evidence identifies the
following certified public records as self-authenticating: A copy of an
official record or report or entry therein, or of a document authorized
by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a
public office, including data compilations in any form certified as
correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the
certification, by certificate complying with paragraphs (1) (2) or (3)
of this rule or complying with any statute or other rule prescribed
pursuant to statutory authority.
Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 902(4). Rule 902(1) requires the document to
bear the seal of a public entity and a signature purporting to be an
attestation or execution. Rule 902(2) addresses public documents without
a seal and provides that any signature of an employee or officer of the
public entity must be certified under seal by a public officer having a
seal and having official duties in the signer's district or political
subdivision verifying the genuineness and official capacity of the
signer. The third paragraph of Rule 902 specifies the requirements for
self-authenticating foreign public documents.
Because the IISD tax statements did not bear a seal or contain a
certification under seal from a public officer, the tax statements were
not self-authenticating as certified public records under Rule 902(4);
See also, Fullick v. City of Baytown, 820 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tex.

App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991 no pet.). However, our review of IISD's
exhibit 1 reveals that it was properly authenticated as a business
record under affidavit pursuant to Rule 902(10).
Paragraph ten of Rule 902 permits self-authentication of records
admissible under 803(6)(records kept in the regular course of business)
provided they are accompanied by an affidavit verifying the
admissibility requirements of 803(6) and the affidavit and records are
filed with the clerk of the court fourteen days before trial and prompt
notice is given of the filing to the other parties. Tex. R. Civ. Evid.
902(10).
In the case before us, the IISD tax statements were certified as
true and correct by Lisa Freeman, tax assessor-collector for IISD.
Freeman's affidavit substantially complies with the affidavit required
to be filed under Rule 902(10). Although there is nothing the record to
indicate the tax statements and affidavit were filed with the court
clerk fourteen days before trial or that appellant received prompt
notice of the filing, appellant does not complain about these matters on
on appeal. Because we conclude the trial court's ruling is sustainable
under Rule 902(10), we resolve appellant's first issue against him.
We next turn to the tax statements admitted as Irving's exhibit
1. Like IISD's tax statements, Irving's tax statements were not under
seal and did not contain a certification under seal as required for
self-authentication under Rule 902(4). However, appellant also objected
to the admission of these statements asserting he was not given timely

notice of the statements and the accompanying business records affidavit
as required by Rule 902(10); the trial court sustained the objection as
to notice and this ruling is not challenged on appeal. Because these
records were not properly authenticated under either rule 902(4), the
trial court erred in admitting them into evidence. Without the tax
statements, there is no evidence to support the trial court's judgment
in Irving's favor. We therefore resolve appellant's second issue in his
favor.
We affirm the trial court's judgment with respect to IISD,
concluding the tax statements were self-authenticating under rule
902(10). We reverse that part of the trial court's judgment in favor of
Irving, however, concluding the tax statements comprising the sole
evidence supporting its claims were not properly authenticated. We
render judgment that Irving take nothing on its claims against
appellant.

MOLLY FRANCIS
JUSTICE
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File Date[11/01/2004]